Over the past six months, Hungary held the presidency of the Council of the European Union. There was considerable debate beforehand about whether Hungary should even be allowed to take on this role, given that the country under Orbán’s government is no longer a democracy and is the subject of multiple rule-of-law procedures. So, how did the Orbán government perform during its presidency? Here’s a brief evaluation:

Quantitatively Poor: The Hungarian Council Presidency concluded only 8 legislative files (Ordinary Legislative Procedures, OLP). This is a fraction of what a typical presidency achieves (Belgium 69, Spain 68, Sweden 46). Even compared to presidencies following European elections, Orbán’s government performed worse than any other in history (Finland 2019: 23, Italy 2014: 20).

Qualitatively Poor: Orbán undermined European unity right at the beginning of the presidency with his so-called “peace mission” to Kyiv, Moscow, and Mar-a-Lago (including a handshake with Vladimir Putin). This likely violated EU treaties, which prohibit individual member states from assuming foreign policy roles on behalf of the Union.
His confrontational approach led the European Commission to announce in July 2024 that it would boycott meetings with the Hungarian presidency. Orbán repeatedly spread falsehoods about the European Parliament and the Commission and utterly failed in his role as an “honest broker” between EU institutions.
In December, his last-ditch attempt to negotiate a ceasefire in Ukraine alienated Ukrainian President Zelenskyy and once again undermined European unity.

Domestically Poor: The Hungarian government failed to fulfill any of its promises regarding rule-of-law reforms. Recent reform attempts by Orbán’s government were inadequate. The rule of law in Hungary remains broken. €22.5 billion in EU funds remain frozen, over €1 billion will expire at the end of the year, and these funds are lost for the Hungarian people.
Additionally, the Orbán government is suspected of systematically wiretapping the opposition leader and EU delegations. There is no indication of a departure from the government’s authoritarian course in Budapest.

Conclusion: A successful Council Presidency is usually marked by its “invisibility”—working behind the scenes to negotiate, find compromises, and facilitate the passage of numerous laws and decisions. Viktor Orbán achieved the exact opposite. He was loud, disruptive, and accomplished nothing to advance Europe. It’s a relief that his term is over, and with Poland taking over the presidency, a sense of normalcy is gradually returning.